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Abstract 
Most dynamic models of congestion pricing use fully time-variant tolls. However, in 
practice, tolls are uniform over the day or at most have a few steps. Such uniform and step 
tolls have received surprisingly little attention from the literature. Moreover, most models that 
do study them assume that demand is insensitive to price. This seems an empirically 
questionable assumption that, as this paper finds, strongly affects the implications of step 
tolling for the consumer. First-best tolling has no effect on the generalised price, and thus 
leaves the consumer equally well off as without tolling. Conversely, under price-sensitive 
demand, step tolling increases the price and lowers the number of users, making consumers 
worse off. The more steps the step toll has, the closer it approximates the first-best toll, 
thereby increasing the welfare gain and making consumers better off. This makes it important 
for real-world tolls to have as many steps as possible: this not only raises welfare, but also 
increases the political acceptability of the scheme by making consumers better off.  
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1. Introduction 
Theoretical models of dynamic road congestion pricing generally use a fully time-variant toll. 
However, in practice, there are no such tolls. In practice, tolls are constant over the day or at 
most have a few steps in them. For example, the Oslo toll ring has a uniform toll that is 
constant over the day (Odeck and Bråthen, 1997). The London scheme has a uniform toll that 
is constant between 7:00 and 18:00.
1
 In contrast, Singapore uses step tolls: the toll is at its 
lowest level in the early morning, and then increases in steps up to its highest level during the 
centre of the morning peak; thereafter, it decreases again in steps (see Fig. 1 in Section 2 for 
an example step toll). For the evening peak a similar pattern holds, but this paper will ignore 
the evening peak. The “Bugis-Marina Centre (Nicoll Highway)” in Singapore has 7 steps in 
the toll during the weekday morning peak.
2
 The Stockholm pricing scheme has 5 steps in the 
                                               
1 This follows www.tfl.gov.uk/tfl/roadusers/congestioncharge/whereandwhen/  as retrieved on 18 January 2010  
2 Rates for 3 May to 2010 to 1 August 2010, as retrieved on 11 May 2010 from 
www.onemotoring.com.sg/publish/onemotoring/en/on_the_roads/ERP_Rates.html  
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morning.
3
 But step tolls are also used in the USA, for example on SR-91 and San Francisco-
Oakland Bay Bridge in California and the SR-520 and SR 16 Tacoma Narrows bridges.
4
 Such 
uniform and step tolls have received surprisingly little attention in the literature. Moreover, 
models of step tolls generally assume that demand is fixed and thus insensitive to price.
5
 This 
seems an implausible assumption, as empirical research shows that transport demand does 
vary with the generalised travel price (or price for brevity). For a review of these price 
elasticities see, for example, Brons, Nijkamp, Pels and Rietveld (2002) and Graham and 
Glaiser (2004).  
 In the bottleneck model, first-best pricing changes the departure rate of drivers (i.e. it 
changes behaviour), thereby halving marginal social cost and generalised user cost (or user 
cost for brevity) for a given number of users. For social optimum, marginal social cost should 
equal demand. Due to the halving of marginal social cost, this occurs when the number of 
users in the first-best equilibrium is the same as in the no-toll equilibrium. Consequently, the 
price and consumer surplus remain the same as before the toll. A uniform toll is constant 
throughout the peak and causes no change in the departure rate. It can only limit congestion 
cost by reducing demand. The optimal uniform toll equals marginal external cost (i.e. 
marginal social cost minus user cost) (see also Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey, 1993). Uniform 
tolling raises the price and lowers the number of users and consumer surplus; this scheme is 
thus comparable to tolling in the textbook static-congestion model, where tolling is also 
harmful for the consumer and has a much lower gain than the first-best bottleneck toll. 
 Step tolling is in between uniform and first-best tolling: it somewhat changes the departure 
pattern, but also raises the price. This makes it important to control for price sensitivity of 
demand when considering step tolling. The more steps there are, the more marginal social 
cost is reduced, the lower the price is, and the higher consumer surplus is. As the number of 
steps goes to infinity, the step toll generally approaches the first-best toll, and the consumer 
becomes equally well off as without tolling. This conclusion has an important policy 
implication: it is essential to give a toll as many steps as possible, as this not only raises 
welfare, but also increases the acceptability of congestion pricing by making it less harmful 
for the consumer. 
 This paper investigates step tolling in three different models that use bottleneck 
congestion. The first model is the ADL model following Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey (1990, 
1993); the second model is the Laih model of Laih (1994, 2004); and the third model is the 
Braking model of Lindsey, Van den Berg and Verhoef (2010). In the Laih model, an m-step 
toll lowers total cost by a fraction ½∙m/(1+m): so with a single step, the reduction is ¼ (or half 
                                               
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stockholm_congestion_tax as retrieved on 30 May 2011. 
4 Respectively www.octa.net/91_schedules.aspx, bata.mtc.ca.gov/tolls/schedule.htm, and 
www.wsdot.wa.gov/Tolling/TollRates.htm as retrieved on 22 January 2012. 
5 Interesting exceptions are Arnott et al. (1993),Chu (1999) and Ge and Stewart (2010).Here, the latter two  have fixed overall 
demand. But Chu (1999) has a logit distribution of users over driving alone, carpool and bus, making the number of 
(effective) vehicles dependent on the toll; and in Ge and Stewart (2010) only two of the three routes are tolled, making the 
number of toll-route users dependant on the tolls. 
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that of the first-best toll); with two steps, it is 1/3; and as the number of step goes to infinity, 
the toll approaches the first-best toll (Laih, 2004). In the ADL model, the gain is larger for a 
finite number of steps, while the toll also approaches the first-best toll as m goes to infinity. 
The Braking model takes into account that drivers have an incentive to wait passing the 
tolling point just before the toll is lowered, as this substantially lowers the toll they pay while 
only marginally increasing travel time and schedule delay. A consequence of this is that the 
bottleneck capacity will go unused for some time during the peak, and this inefficiency raises 
total costs. The inefficiency only becomes larger as the number of steps increases, and thus 
the Braking toll never approaches the first-best toll and always has a lower gain. The other 
two models are only stable if the government can prevent the braking (Lindsey et al., 2010). 
Note that this braking behaviour has been observed in practice in Singapore with the area 
licence scheme up to 1994 (Png, Olszewski and Menon, 1994) and with the electronic road 
pricing from 1994 (Chew, 2008), at the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge (Lee and Frick, 
2011), and in Stockholm (Fosgerau, 2011). 
 The next section starts with a general model of step tolling for any model of dynamic 
congestion. Then, Section 3 turns to the bottleneck model and discusses the equilibria without 
tolling, with first-best tolling, and with step tolling in the Laih, ADL, and braking model. 
Section 4 presents numerical examples to illustrate the effect of price sensitivity. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. General step toll model 
This section derives the optimal level of the time invariant part of the toll for a congestion 
model and a form of the step part of the toll. The solution thus assumes that there is a formula 
for the time-variant part, and is based on the results of Arnott et al. (1993) on a uniform toll 
and a coarse toll (i.e. a single-step toll). The toll τ for arrival time t consists of the time-
invariant part θ and a time-variant step part ρi (where the level of the step part depends on t): 
 
[ ] .it      (1) 
 
The i indicates the ith toll level. As Fig. 1 shows, the central toll (ρ1) is around the preferred 
arrival time (t
*
) and is indicated by 1. The further out a step part is, the higher its indicator and 
the lower its level. I allow the levels of the ith early (before t
*
) and the ith late toll (after t
*
) to 
be different, but the number of early and late tolls is the same. I indicate an early step part by 
superscript 
+
 and a late step part by 
−
. The ith early part starts at  and ends at ; the times 
for the ith late part are 1it

  and .it

 This is not a restrictive assumption, as this turns out to be 
optimal in all models. With step tolling, the peak starts at 
'
st and ends at 
'
et . These times are 
generally different than without tolling (ts and te), as the numbers of users differ. 
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Figure 1: Notation in the multi-step toll models 
 
Welfare equals the integral of (inverse) demand D minus Total Costs (TC), which equals 
average user cost ( E[ ]c ) multiplied by the number of users (N): 
 
0 0
[ ] [ ] E[ ]
N N
W D n dn TC D n dn c N        (2) 
 
To find the optimal time-invariant part (θ) for a given pattern of the step toll, the following 
Lagrangian is maximised: 
 
   
0
E[ ] E[ ] [ ] E[ ] E[ ] E[ ] ,
N
L W D c D n dn c N D c                  (3) 
 
where E[∙] indicates an average.6 I use this operator as user cost and step toll vary over time. 
The first order conditions are: 
 
 / 0 E[ ] E[ ]/ / E[ ]/ E[ ]/ ,L N D c N c N D N c N N                 (4a) 
/ 0 ,L                                                                                                                                                 (4b) 
/ 0 E[ ] E[ ] .L D c          (4c) 
 
These equations imply: 
 
E[ ] E[ ] E[ ] E[ ] E[ ]/ E[ ].MSC c MEC N c N             (5) 
 
                                               
6 This solution assumes that the dynamic congestion model has a reduced form that only depends on the total number of 
users: so, just as in the bottleneck model, there is a formula for costs and step part of the toll at time t as a function of the 
total number of users. Further, the system is in user equilibrium, so that the price is constant throughout the peak. This 
allows me to use Lagrangian optimisation instead of optimal control theory which is difficult to use in the context of the 
bottleneck model (see Yang and Huang, 1997).  Because of the assumption that the price is constant over time, one only 
needs the single constraint that states that the price for the average user (E[c]+E[ρ]+θ) should equal inverse demand (D). 
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The MSC is marginal social cost, which is the derivative of total cost to the number of users. 
The MEC is marginal external cost, which at t equals the difference between MSC and user 
cost c[t]. Just as Arnott et al. (1993) showed for a single-step toll, in general, the θ is set such 
that the price equals the average MSC (or alternatively the average toll equals the average 
marginal externality), and accordingly the average user internalise her external cost.  
 Since a uniform toll is a zero step toll, the above discussion implies that this toll should 
equal the average externality. Step tolling changes the equilibrium departure pattern and 
lowers the externality and price for a given number of users. But again the average toll, E[], 
equals the average marginal externality. 
 
3. The bottleneck model 
3.1. No-Toll (NT) equilibrium  
I keep the discussion of the no-toll (NT) and first-best (FB) equilibria brief as these are 
extensively discussed in, for example, Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey (1990, 1993), as well as 
in textbooks such as Small and Verhoef (2007). The N identical users travel alone by car from 
the origin to the destination, which are connected by a road that is subject to bottleneck 
queuing congestion. Free-flow travel time is normalised to zero. Without a queue, an user thus 
departs from the origin, passes the bottleneck, and arrives at the destination all at the same 
moment. User cost for an arrival at t is the sum of travel delay (c
TD
) and schedule delay costs 
(c
SD
) from arriving at a different time than the common preferred arrival time (t
*
): 
 
* *[ ] [ ] Max 0, Max 0, .TD SDc t c c T t t t t t                   (6) 
 
The α is value of travel time or the unit cost of an hour of travel delay, β is the value of 
schedule delay early (i.e. the cost of arriving an hour before t
*
), and γ is the value of schedule 
delay late.  
The peak starts at ts and ends at ts. At these moments travel delay is zero while schedule 
delay cost is at its highest: 
 
* ,s
N
t t
s

 
  

                                                                                                               (7a) 
 * .e
N
t t
s

 
  

                                                                                                                (7b) 
 
In these equations, s is the capacity of the bottleneck. Equilibrium user cost is given in (8). 
Since the toll is zero, the generalised price P
NT
 equals c
NT
. Total costs in (9) are c
 NT∙N. Half of 
this total is travel delay cost while the other half is schedule delay cost. Marginal social costs 
are twice user cost, which makes marginal external cost (MEC) in (10) equal user cost. Here, 
superscript NT indicates the No-Toll equilibrium. The preference parameter δ is used to 
shorten the algebra and equals (β∙γ)/(β+γ). 
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/NT NTc p N s    (8) 
2 /NT NTTC c N N s     (9) 
/NTMEC N s   (10) 
 
For the interpretation of step tolling it is instructive to adapt the textbook demand and cost 
diagram for a static-flow-congestion model to the bottleneck model. Fig. 2 gives such a 
diagram for the no-toll equilibrium. I can use what is basically a static diagram, because 
reduced-form costs in the bottleneck model only depend on the total number of users. User 
equilibrium is found where demand equals user cost. But at this point the MSC is above the 
equilibrium price as part of the social cost is external to the consumer. And it are these 
marginal external costs that we would like the user to take into account by setting a 
congestion toll. 
 
  
Figure 2: No-toll equilibrium 
 
3.2. First-Best (FB) equilibrium  
Travel delays are a pure deadweight loss: drivers could arrive at the same arrival times 
(hence having the same schedule delays) but with zero travel delays, if their rate of arrival at 
the bottleneck would equal capacity. Moreover, this would also leave ts and te unchanged, and 
thus the equilibrium price remains equal to −β∙ts=δ∙N/s. The first-best toll, τ
FB
[t], that achieves 
this equals, at each arrival time (t), the travel delay cost at t in the NT case: 
 
* *[ ] / Max 0, Max 0,FB t N s t t t t                  
 
This FB toll halves total cost, average Marginal External Cost (E[MEC]), and average user 
cost (E[c]) as the travel delays are converted into toll payments; while the price is unaffected: 
 
E[cFB]=½ δ∙N/s,                                                                                                                                           (11) 
PFB=δ∙N/s, (12) 
MSCNT
cNT
D
NNTN
$ 
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E[MECFB]= ½ δ∙N/s, (13) 
TCFB=c∙N= ½ δ∙N2/s. (14) 
 
Since the price is unaffected, total number of users and consumer surplus remain the same. 
Welfare increases since half of the total costs are converted into toll revenue. At each point in 
time, the toll equals the MEC, and thus is the externality fully internalised. 
The equilibrium in Fig. 2 for the no-toll case was basically the same as in a static model. 
But Fig. 3 for first-best tolling is different as MSC and user cost (c) are halved. As the MSC is 
twice user cost, the MSC curve tilts down to the level of the NT user-cost curve, while user 
cost tilts down to half of its NT level. This also explains why FB tolling does not change the 
number of users: at N
NT
=N
FB
, the new MSC equals demand, which is what is needed for 
optimum. The price and the MSC are constant over time, but the toll and user cost are not; this 
is why, in Fig. 3, the cost and toll are labelled with the Expectance operator (E[∙]).    
 
 
Figure 3: First-best equilibrium 
 
3.3 Uniform toll 
The uniform toll does not affect the departure rate. It can only limit congestion cost by 
reducing demand. Hence, the formulas for marginal social cost and user cost remain the same 
as in the NT case. In Fig. 4, this implies that there is no downward tilt of the curves. To 
ensure that marginal social cost equal demand, the number of users must be reduced from N
NT
 
to N
U
 (superscript 
U
 indicates the Uniform toll). This is done by setting a time-invariant toll 
equal to MEC=MSC−c, just as in the textbook static model. Just as in the static model, 
uniform tolling lowers the number of users and consumer surplus.  
As Fig. 5 shows, the uniform toll is generally higher than the average first-best toll because 
the marginal external cost is higher for a given number of users. The MEC in the uniform case 
is δ∙NU/s; in the first-best case it is on average ½∙δ∙NFB/s. So the MEC is higher with a uniform 
toll as long as N
FB
 is not more than twice N
U
. As Fig. 4 indicates, uniform tolling raises the 
price as long as demand is not perfectly elastic (i.e. a flat curve D) or perfectly inelastic (i.e. 
fixed). Hence, under these conditions, uniform tolling lowers consumer surplus, even though 
it does raise welfare. 
MSCNT
cNT
N
MSCFB
E[cFB]
=
E[ ]
NT FBN N
D$ 
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Figure 4: Equilibrium with the uniform toll 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Level of the uniform toll 
 
3.4. Laih step toll 
The Laih (1994; 2004) model is the simplest step-toll model for the bottleneck model to 
solve; the Braking and ADL model are more tedious. The models differ in how they achieve 
that prices before and after a toll decrease are equal; before t
*
, when the toll only increases, 
the three models have the same set-up. In the Laih model, there are separate queues for 
drivers who pass the tolling point before and after a toll decrease at it

, where the users who 
arrive after it

 start waiting in front of the tolling point before it

 In the ADL model, there are 
no separate queues; instead a mass departure at it

 equalises expected prices before and after 
it

. In the Braking model, there is a single queue and no mass departure, instead users start 
waiting to pass the tolling point well before the toll is lowered to lessen the toll they pay. 
The Laih model is easiest to solve because the step part of the toll does not change the 
arrival window and price. If the number of users were the same, at each t, the sum of user 
cost, c[t], and step part of the toll, ρi , would equal the price without tolling. But as the optimal 
time-invariant part is positive, Laih tolling increases the price.  
MSCNT
cNT
N
MSCFB
E[cFB]
=
E[ ]
NT FBN N
D
Uniform Toll
FB
2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5
2
4
6
8
Toll 
t 
$ 
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Following Laih (1994, 2004), the start and end time of the peak follow the same formulas 
as those for the NT and FB equilibria in (7a,b): 
 
* ,s
N
t t
s

 
   

  (15a) 
 * .e
N
t t
s

 
   

 (15b) 
 
But total costs are lower for given N, as part of the travel time costs are converted into toll 
payments, which are not costs but transfers from the consumer to the government. Total costs  
and total toll revenue are  
 
2 1
1 ,
2 1
N m
TC
s m

 
  
 
 (16) 
21
.
2 1
step fixed m NTR TR TR N
m s
     

 (17) 
 
Here, superscript
 s
 indicates the new step-tolling equilibrium. In optimum, the step parts of the 
toll are symmetric in the Laih model: i.e. the ith early and late toll are equal and i i 
  . 
The step part of the toll follows  
 
1
1
,     
1
1
,   2,..., .i i i
m N
m s
m i
i m
m
 
    
  

 
    
 (18) 
 
The step part has a simple pattern: the second ρ2 is a fraction (m−1)/m of the central ρ1 that is 
around t
*
, the third toll a fraction (m−2)/m. This pattern is this same as with a fixed number of 
users, since this minimises total cost for given N. Conversely, the θ is set to optimise N so that 
demand equals the MSC for a given cost structure.  
The average step part of the toll, E[ρ], equals TRstep/N. Average marginal external cost is 
 
[ ] 1 ;
2 2
N m
E MEC
s m

 
  
 
 (19) 
 
where the externality decreases with the number of steps, just as marginal social cost and user 
cost do. For given N, a single step toll reduces the average MEC by a fraction 1/4, with 2 step, 
this is 1/3; and as m goes to infinity, the MEC approaches the first-best MEC of ½∙δ∙N/s. 
Using that the average step toll should equal the average MEC, the optimal time-invariant part 
of the toll must be 
[ ] [ ] .
1
N m
E MEC E
s m
    

 (20) 
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This θ approaches zero as the number of steps m approaches infinity, as then the step part of 
the toll approaches the first-best toll that at each t equals the MEC.  
 The price at the start of the peak at '
st  is the sum of scheduling cost,  ' * /st t N s    and 
the time-invariant part of the toll θ; the time-variant toll and travel time are zero. For other 
used arrival times the price is the same, but travel time and toll are generally non-zero: 
 
[ ] [ ] .NP MSC E c E
s
           (21) 
 
Fig. 6 compares the single-step Laih toll with the FB and uniform toll and is based on the 
numerical example of Section 4. Fig. 7 shows the equilibrium for a single-step Laih toll. Step 
tolling tilts down the cost curves, which means that the price increase is less and the average 
toll is lower than with uniform tolling. For a finite number of steps, the price with Laih tolling 
will be higher than with FB tolling.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: A single-step toll 
 
 
Figure 7: Equilibrium with a single-step toll 
Step Toll
Uniform Toll
FB
2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5
2
4
6
8
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D
N
NU NNTNS
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3.5. ADL step toll 
With the ADL toll of Arnott et al. (1990; 1993) and fixed demand, step tolling lowers the 
price and shifts the peak to later (i.e. the start and end times are later). Each time the toll drops 
a level there is a mass departure of users. If α<γ, then just after the last user of the ith mass 
arrives at ,it
  there is the mass departure of the users who pay the i−1th toll.7 Without the 
shift of the peak, the price for a user in a mass departure would be lower than for a user that 
travels during the rest of the peak. By having more drivers in the masses and fewer drivers 
outside, expected prices are made constant over time. And it is this that shifts the peak to later 
and lowers the equilibrium price. 
Lindsey et al. (2010) find that generalising the ADL model to m steps is much harder than 
for the other models. Already for two or three steps the formulas are very complex. This 
analytical section focuses on single- and two-step tolls; the numerical model goes up to 10 
steps. The ADL toll has, for a finite m, a larger welfare gain than the Laih toll, but also 
approaches the FB toll as m goes to infinity. Due to the shift of the peak and mass departures, 
the ADL toll is asymmetric with the ith late toll being higher than the ith early toll. Following 
Lindsey et al. (2010), the early step parts of the toll follow the same formula as in the Laih 
model (see (18)): 
 
1
1
,   1,..., ,     1,..., .i
m i
i m i m
m
 
 
     (22) 
   
Conversely, the late tolls are not simple fractions of the central toll, ρ1: 
 
   3 22 3 ,      2,..., .i i i i m  
        (23) 
 
It is due to this more complex formula that there are no simple solutions for the ADL toll. To 
at least give some analytical insight, I give the analytics for one and two steps below. 
  
3.5.1. Coarse (or single-step) ADL toll 
For a single-step toll, the peak starts and ends at 
 
' * ( 2 ) (3 2 ) ,
2( )( )
s
N
t t
s
      

     
   
   
   
 
' * ( 2 ) (3 2 ) .
2( )( )
e
N
t t
s
      

     
   
   
   
 
                                               
7 Lindsey et al. (2010) and Daniel (2009) show that with α>γ, there are normal departures after the ith mass that still pay the 
ith toll. This then ensures that there is no shift in the peak; and therefore the price and toll formulas are the same as in the 
Laih model, and hence the ADL model simplifies to the Laih model. I focus on α<γ, as this seems more likely for car travel.   
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These equations only differ from the equations for the NT and Laih equilibria by the terms in 
brackets. For '
st the term is smaller than 1 for relevant parameter values (i.e. γ>α>β>0), while 
the term for '
et is above 1. Hence, the peak starts and ends later for a given N.   
Total costs and toll revenue are  
 
2 1 ( 2 )
1 ,
4 ( )( )
N
TC
s
   

   
  
  
  
 (24) 
2
1 .
2
step fixed NTR TR TR N
s
 
 
  
 
       
 
 (25) 
 
Marginal External Cost is on average  
 
1 ( 2 )
[ ] 1 .
4 ( )( )
N
E MEC
s
   

   
  
  
  
 (26) 
 
This equation shows that, for a given N, the ADL externality is lower than in the Laih model 
in (20), since 
1 ( 2 ) 1
4 ( )( ) 2 2 4
m
m
   
   
 
 
  
when γ>α>β>0. Still, the time-invariant part, θ, 
follows the same formula as in the single-step Laih model, which implies that the average step 
part, E[ρ] is lower (for given N): 
 
1
[ ] [ ] .
2
N
E MEC E
s
      (27) 
 
Due to the larger downward tilt of the cost curves, the consumer is better off with a single-
step ADL toll than with a single-step Laih toll. 
 
3.5.2. Two-step ADL toll 
The formulas with two steps are much more difficult than with a single step, and the more 
steps there are, the more complex the formulas become. The early and late tolls are now 
asymmetric:  
 
   1 3 3 2
2 2 ( )
1 ,
3 3 3 8 9 16 9
N
s
  
 
       
 
        
 (28a) 
1
2 ,
2

    (28b) 
 
    
3 2 3
2 1 3 3 2
5 3 16 7
.
4 3 2 2 3
      
 
       

    
 
      
 (28c) 
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Hence, the early toll 
2
  is half the central toll 
1 ,  while the late toll 2
  is somewhat higher. 
Total costs follow 
 
      
      
3 2 2 2 2
3 3 2
2 3 2 11 6 2 8 9 3
1 .
2 3 3 8 9 16 9
N
TC
s
           

         
       
  
      
 
 (29) 
 
 Unlike with a single step, the formula for the time-invariant part of the toll now differs 
from the one in the Laih model: 
  
 
   3 3 2
41
[ ] [ ] 1 .
1 2 3 3 8 9 16 9
N
E MEC E
s
  
  
       
 
           
 (30) 
 
In the Laih model, the term between brackets equals 1. In this ADL model, the term is below 
1 when γ>α>β>0. Accordingly, the θ and average toll are lower for a given N. Observing the 
complexity of the ADL toll, I will keep the analytical discussion of the ADL model to two 
steps, and will now continue with the analytical framework for the braking toll. 
 
3.6. Braking step toll 
The ADL and Laih model overlook that drivers have an incentive to delay reaching the 
tolling point when the toll is about to drop if the waiting cost they incur is outweighed by the 
money they save. The Braking model of Lindsey et al. (2010) takes this incentive into account 
(see their paper for a more detailed discussion of the model). Users stop passing the tolling 
point a time ∆ti before the ith level decreases to the i−1th level at it
 . The first users to pay the 
i−1th level arrive just after .it
 The last users to pay the ith toll arrive at .bi i it t t
    For the 
prices at these two arrival times to equal, the ∆ti must equal    1 / .i i      The total 
time the bottleneck is idle, t , is the sum of all the it . It depends only on the level of ρ1 and 
preference parameters α and γ: 
 
1 /( )t      . (31) 
 
The step part of the toll follows the same formula as in the Laih model, but the levels are 
generally different, as, with price sensitive demand, the numbers of users differ: 
 
1 1
1
,     ,   2,..., .
1
i i i
m N m i
i m
m s m
      
 
       
  (32) 
 
The idle time t is an inefficiency and pure deadweight loss that raises costs and makes 
step tolling more harmful for the user. The idle time does not disappear as m becomes larger. 
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Actually, it only increases with m, since ρ1 increases with m, and following (31) t  is an 
increasing function of ρ1. This implies that the braking toll does not approach the first-best 
toll: even for an infinite m, its gain will be lower. The formulas for total cost and toll revenue 
are more complex with braking than in the Laih model, as they contain the fraction δ/(α+γ): 
 
2 1
1 1 ,
1 2
N m
TC
s m


 
  
    
   
 (33) 
2 1
1 .
1 2
step fixed N mTR TR TR N
s m

 
 
 
      
  
 (34) 
   
From (33) the average MEC can be derived, and it turns out to be again similar to in the Laih 
model but for the δ/(α+γ) term: 
 
1
[ ] 1 1 .
1 2
N m
E MEC
s m


 
  
    
   
 (35) 
 
 For given N, the average Braking MEC is higher than in the Laih model. This higher MEC 
is due to the extra travel costs caused by the time that the bottleneck is idle. Interestingly, as 
the δ/(α+γ) term is in both the user cost as in the average step part of the toll (E[ρ]=TRstep/N), 
the fixed part of the toll, θ, simplifies to the same formula as in the Laih model: 
 
1
[ ] [ ]
1
N
E MEC E
s m
    

 (36) 
 
For given N, the time-invariant toll is thus the same in the Laih and Braking model, while the 
step-part is higher with braking. The extra marginal external costs due to the braking are 
internalised for the average user via the step toll, which means that the time-invariant toll can 
follow the same formula as in the Laih model. Braking tolling is more harmful for the 
consumer than Laih tolling for two reasons: (1) the time the bottleneck is idle raises costs, and 
(2) the average toll is higher for the same number of users in the braking model than in the 
Laih model. This makes preventing braking even more important with price-sensitive demand 
than with fixed demand, where only the first effect occurs. 
 The model assumes that there is no direct cost to the user of braking. This seems 
unrealistic: standing still besides a road can be very dangerous, which means that there are 
costs from the increased risk of an accident. Further, this standing still is likely to be a traffic 
violation, meaning that there is also a risk of a fine. With such costs of braking, introducing 
more steps in the toll might solve the braking problem, the toll saving becomes ever smaller, 
while the extra cost from risk of accident and fine remain. Limiting braking was one of the 
reasons why Singapore introduced extra steps in 2003 (Chew, 2008). Moreover, it also seems 
important for the government to actively control for cars standing still and fine those that do, 
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as this behaviour is not only dangerous for the driver as well as for other drivers (i.e. it 
imposes and extra accident externality), but also reduced the gain from step tolling.  
 
4. Numerical model 
This section illustrates the effects of step tolling with price-sensitive demand using a 
numerical example. The section looks at tolls with one up to ten steps. I use the following 
preference parameters: the unit cost of an hour of travel delay (i.e. the value of time) is α=8, 
the value of schedule delay early is β=4, and the value of schedule delay late is γ=15.6. The 
bottleneck capacity is s=3600 cars an hour. The no-toll equilibrium has 9000 drivers, so the 
peak lasts 2.5 hours. The inverse demand follows a linear function, and the elasticity with 
respect to generalised price is −0.4 in the NT equilibrium.  
Fig. 8 shows the patterns of the tolls with 5 steps. The ADL toll is the solid (blue) line, the 
(red) stripped curve is the Braking toll, the (green) dot-dashed curve the Laih toll, and the 
(black) dotted curve is the FB toll. The five-step toll is on average lower than a single-step 
toll: in Fig. 8, the 5-step tolls hug the first-best toll; in Fig. 6, the single-step toll is much 
higher than the FB toll. With price sensitive demand, the toll at the start and end of the peak 
equals the time-invariant term and is above the FB toll. The peak lasts much longer with the 
Braking toll than with the other step tolls due to the time the bottleneck is idle, even though it 
has the lowest number of users. The ADL and Laih peak last shorter than the FB peak, as 
these tolls result in a lower number of users. Before t
*
 the ADL and Laih toll are very similar 
in their levels, after t
*
 the ADL toll tends to be higher than the Laih toll. 
 
 
Figure 8: 5-steps toll for the ADL, Laih, and Braking model 
 
Figs. 9-11 compare for the three regimes the (generalised) price, percentage change in 
consumer surplus, and relative efficiency (i.e. welfare gain from the NT case relative to the 
FB gain).   
 
16 
 
The more steps there are, the better off the consumers: the price is lower, while consumer 
surplus and number of users are higher. A uniform toll or a step toll with few steps is a crude 
instrument to reduce the congestion problem; they (primarily) equate the private price with 
marginal social cost by lowering the number of users. The fully-time-variant FB toll equalises 
MSC and private price by halving the MSC, while keeping the number of users the same. The 
more steps a step-toll has, the closer its approximation of the FB toll, and the more it alters the 
departure pattern, shortens total travel delay, and lowers the MSC.  
The price development over the number of steps differs strongly between fixed and price 
sensitive demand. With price sensitivity, the price decreases with m, since the time-invariant 
toll becomes lower. With fixed demand, there is no time-invariant toll (or more precisely it is 
undefined and therefore arbitrarily set to zero); and the price is independent of m in the Laih 
model, while it increases with m in the ADL and braking model (Lindsey et al., 2010).  
 
 
Figure 9: Generalised price as a function of the number of steps  
 
 
Figure 11: Percentage change in the consumer surplus as a function of the number of steps 
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Figure 11: Relative efficiency as a function of the number of steps 
 
5. Effect of the price sensitivity 
Figure 12 compares the relative efficiencies of the three step tolls over different price 
elasticities: pane (a) does this for the ADL toll, pane (b) for the Laih toll, and pane (c) for the 
braking toll. Figure 13 compares the change in average consumer surplus (or alternatively the 
change in the average distance between demand function and price). The figures show that not 
only is welfare higher with more steps, the consumer is also better off: with a price elasticity 
of  −0.4, a single-step toll decreases average consumer surplus by 1.17 (or a 22% lower total 
consumer surplus), while a 10-step toll by only 0.25 (or a 4.99% lower total surplus).  
The effects of step tolling depend strongly on the price sensitivity. The gain of step tolling 
is higher and the consumer surplus loss is lower with more price sensitive demand: this is 
because it becomes easier for users to adapt their demand and toll revenue becomes larger 
relative to the consumer surplus loss. Note that this effect of price sensitivity on consumer 
surplus also occurs in a static model of congestion. Still, with more sensitive demand, step 
tolling lowers the number users more, and the percentage loss in consumer surplus is larger. 
The latter is because the initial surplus in the NT equilibrium decreases. In the limit, as the 
demand becomes perfectly elastic (i.e. a flat demand function) consumer surplus becomes 
zero in all regimes.    
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   (a) ADL toll                 (b) Laih toll 
          
(c) Braking toll 
 
Figure 12: Relative efficiency and price sensitivity for (a) the ADL, (b) Laih, and (c) braking model 
    
 
    (a) ADL toll      (b) Laih toll 
 
      
(c) Braking toll 
 
Figure 13: Change in average consumer surplus due to step tolling and price sensitivity for (a) the 
ADL, (b) the Laih, and (c) the braking model 
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5. Conclusion 
Models of (step) tolling usually assume that demand is price insensitive. This assumption 
seems empirically questionable, and, as this paper found, has important implications for the 
effects of step tolling. In the bottleneck model, a first-best toll that is fully time variant leaves 
the price unchanged, and thus price sensitivity has no effect. Conversely, step tolling raises 
the price, and thus reduces consumer surplus and the number of users. Accordingly, the 
welfare and consumer surplus changes due to step tolling depend strongly on the price 
sensitivity. The more steps there are in the toll, the closer it approximates the first-best toll, 
and the better off the consumer is. This makes it extra important for real-world tolling systems 
to have as many steps in the toll as possible: this not only raises the welfare gain of tolling, 
but also raises the political acceptability of tolling.  
For future research it is interesting to study the effect of step tolling under price sensitive 
demand and heterogeneous preferences, this would allow studying of both aggregate welfare 
effects as well as distributional effects. Xiao, Qian and Zhang (2011) study the ADL single-
step toll under fixed demand and the heterogeneity from Vickrey (1973) that varies the values 
of time, schedule delay early, and schedule delay late in fixed proportions. They find that step 
tolling decreases total users cost more with this heterogeneity than with homogeneity, because 
users with high values self select to the tolled period, while those with low values travel 
during the untolled period. It would also be interesting to include heterogeneity in the ratio of 
value of time and schedule delay early and in ratio of values of schedule delay early and late. 
Van den Berg and Verhoef (2011) study fully time-variant tolling under two dimensions of 
heterogeneity: (1) the heterogeneity from Vickrey (1973), and (2) in the ratio of value of time 
to value of schedule delay. They find that whether a certain user wins or loses depends on her 
values of time and schedule delay, the extent of both types of heterogeneity, and all the price 
sensitivities. The heterogeneity in the ratio of value of schedule delay early and late should 
also have important effects, as this ratio affects when a user arrives with and without step 
tolling (see Section 4 of Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey (1988, 1993) on the no-toll and first-
best equilibria with this heterogeneity).  
 
Acknowledgements  
Financial support from ERC (AdG Grant #246969 OPTION) is gratefully acknowledged. I thank Erik 
Verhoef, Alexandros Dimitropoulos, Paul Koster and Andrew Koh for valuable suggestions. 
 
References 
Arnott, R., de Palma, A., Lindsey, R., 1988. Schedule delay and departure time decisions with heterogeneous 
commuters. Transportation Research Record 1197, 56–67. 
Arnott, R., de Palma, A., Lindsey, C.R., 1990. Economics of a bottleneck. Journal of Urban Economics 27(1), 
111–130. 
Arnott, R., de Palma, A., Lindsey, C.R., 1993. A structural model of peak-period congestion: a traffic bottleneck 
with elastic demand. American Economic Review 83(1), 161–179. 
Arnott, R., de Palma, A., Lindsey, R., 1994. The welfare effects of congestion tolls with heterogeneous 
commuters. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 28(2), 139–161. 
Brons, M, Nijkamp, P., Pels, E., Rietveld, P., 2002. A meta-analysis of the price elasticity of gasoline demand: a 
SUR approach. Energy Economics 30(5), 2105–2122. 
20 
 
Chu, X., 1999. Alternative congestion technologies. Regional Science and Urban Economics 29(6), 697–722. 
Chew, V., 2008. Electronic road pricing: developments after phase I. National Library Singapore, Singapore 
Infopedia. Retrieved on 17 August 2010, from http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_1386_2009-01-05.html 
Fosgerau, M., 2011. How a fast lane may replace a congestion toll. Transportation Research Part B 45(6), 845–
851. 
Daniel, J.I., 2009. The deterministic bottleneck model with non-atomistic traffic. Working paper of the 
Department of Economics, Alfred Lerner College of Business & Economics, University of Delaware, no. 
2009-08. Retrieved on 25 July 2010, from 
www.lerner.udel.edu/sites/default/files/imce/economics/WorkingPapers/2009/UDWP2009-08.pdf 
Ge, Y.E., Stewart, K., 2010. Investigating boundary issues arising from congestion charging. Paper presented at 
the Fifth Travel Demand Management Symposium, 26-28 October, Aberdeen, Scotland, U.K. 
Graham, D.J., Glaiser, S., 2004. Road traffic demand elasticity estimates: a review. Transport Reviews 24(3), 
261–274.  
Odeck, J., Bråthen, S., 1997.  On public attitudes toward implementation of toll roads: the case of Oslo toll ring. 
Transport Policy 4(2), 73–83. 
Laih, C.H., 1994. Queuing at a bottleneck with single and multi-step tolls. Transportation Research Part A 28(3), 
197–208. 
Laih, C.H., 2004. Effects of the optimal step toll scheme on equilibrium commuter behavior. Applied Economics 
36(1), 59–81. 
Lee, L., Frick, K., 2011. San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge Congestion Pricing. In Congestion pricing projects 
in the San Francisco Bay Area: I-680 express lanes and Bay Bridge time-of-day pricing.  Retrieved on 15 
July 2011, from 
www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/pdfs/revenue/resources/webinars/webinar_congestion_pricing_033011.pdf  
Lindsey, C.R., van den Berg, V.A.C., Verhoef, E.T., 2012. Step tolling with bottleneck queuing congestion. 
Journal of Urban Economics, in press: DOI 10.1016/j.jue.2012.02.001. 
Small, K. A., Verhoef, E.T., 2007. The Economics of Urban Transportation. London: Routledge. 
Png, G.H., Olszewski, P., Menon, A.P.G., 1994. Estimation of the value of travel time of motorists. Journal of 
the Institution of Engineers, Singapore 34(2), 9-13. 
van den Berg, V.A.C., Verhoef, E.T., 2011. Winning or losing from dynamic bottleneck congestion pricing? The 
distributional effects of road pricing with heterogeneity in values of time and schedule delay. Journal of 
Public Economics 95(7–8), 983–992. 
Vickrey, W.S., 1973. Pricing, metering, and efficiently using urban transportation facilities. Highway Research 
Record 476, 36–48.  
Yang, H., Huang, H.J., 1997.  Analysis of the time-varying pricing of a bottleneck with elastic demand using 
optimal control theory. Transportation Research Part B 31(6), 425–440. 
Xiao, F., Qian, Z., Zhang, H.M., 2011. The morning commute problem with coarse toll and nonidentical 
commuters. Networks and Spatial Economics 11(2), 343–369. 
2008-1 Maria T. Borzacchiello 
Irene Casas 
Biagio Ciuffo 
Peter Nijkamp 
 
Geo-ICT in Transportation Science, 25 p.  
 
2008-2 Maura Soekijad Congestion at the floating road? Negotiation in networked innovation, 38 p. 
 Jeroen Walschots  
 Marleen Huysman  
   
2008-3 
 
Marlous Agterberg 
Bart van den Hooff 
Keeping the wheels turning: Multi-level dynamics in organizing networks of 
practice, 47 p. 
 Marleen Huysman  
 Maura Soekijad  
   
2008-4 Marlous Agterberg 
Marleen Huysman 
Bart van den Hooff 
Leadership in online knowledge networks: Challenges and coping strategies in a 
network of practice, 36 p. 
   
2008-5 Bernd Heidergott Differentiability of product measures, 35 p. 
 
 
Haralambie Leahu  
2008-6 Tibert Verhagen 
Frans Feldberg 
Explaining user adoption of virtual worlds: towards a multipurpose motivational 
model, 37 p. 
 Bart van den Hooff  
 Selmar Meents  
   
2008-7 Masagus M. Ridhwan 
Peter Nijkamp 
Piet Rietveld 
Henri L.F. de Groot 
Regional development and monetary policy. A review of the role of monetary 
unions, capital mobility and locational effects, 27 p. 
   
2008-8 Selmar Meents 
Tibert Verhagen 
Investigating the impact of C2C electronic marketplace quality on trust, 69 p. 
   
2008-9 Junbo Yu 
Peter Nijkamp 
 
China’s prospects as an innovative country: An industrial economics 
perspective, 27 p 
2008-10 Junbo Yu 
Peter Nijkamp 
Ownership, r&d and productivity change: Assessing the catch-up in China’s 
high-tech industries, 31 p 
   
2008-11 Elbert Dijkgraaf 
Raymond Gradus 
 
Environmental activism and dynamics of unit-based pricing systems, 18 p. 
2008-12 Mark J. Koetse 
Jan Rouwendal 
 
Transport and welfare consequences of infrastructure investment: A case study 
for the Betuweroute, 24 p 
2008-13 Marc D. Bahlmann 
Marleen H. Huysman 
Tom Elfring 
Peter Groenewegen 
Clusters as vehicles for entrepreneurial innovation and new idea generation – a 
critical assessment 
   
2008-14 Soushi Suzuki 
Peter Nijkamp 
A generalized goals-achievement model in data envelopment analysis: An 
application to efficiency improvement in local government finance in Japan, 24 
p. 
   
2008-15 Tüzin Baycan-Levent External orientation of second generation migrant entrepreneurs. A sectoral 
Peter Nijkamp 
Mediha Sahin 
study on Amsterdam, 33 p. 
   
2008-16 Enno Masurel Local shopkeepers’ associations and ethnic minority entrepreneurs, 21 p. 
   
2008-17 Frank Frößler 
Boriana Rukanova 
Stefan Klein 
Allen Higgins 
Yao-Hua Tan 
Inter-organisational network formation and sense-making: Initiation and 
management of a living lab, 25 p. 
   
2008-18 Peter Nijkamp 
Frank Zwetsloot 
Sander van der Wal 
 
A meta-multicriteria analysis of innovation and growth potentials of European 
regions, 20 p. 
2008-19 Junbo Yu 
Roger R. Stough 
Peter Nijkamp 
Governing technological entrepreneurship in China and the West, 21 p. 
   
2008-20 Maria T. Borzacchiello 
Peter Nijkamp 
Henk J. Scholten 
A logistic regression model for explaining urban development on the basis of 
accessibility: a case study of Naples, 13 p. 
   
2008-21 Marius Ooms Trends in applied econometrics software development 1985-2008, an analysis of 
Journal of Applied Econometrics research articles, software reviews, data and 
code, 30 p. 
   
2008-22 Aliye Ahu Gülümser 
Tüzin Baycan-Levent 
Peter Nijkamp 
Changing trends in rural self-employment in Europe and Turkey, 20 p. 
   
2008-23 Patricia van Hemert 
Peter Nijkamp 
Thematic research prioritization in the EU and the Netherlands: an assessment 
on the basis of content analysis, 30 p. 
   
2008-24 Jasper Dekkers 
Eric Koomen 
Valuation of open space. Hedonic house price analysis in the Dutch Randstad 
region, 19 p. 
   
   
 
2009-1 Boriana Rukanova 
Rolf T. Wignand 
Yao-Hua Tan 
From national to supranational government inter-organizational systems: An 
extended typology, 33 p. 
 
2009-2 
 
Marc D. Bahlmann 
Marleen H. Huysman 
Tom Elfring 
Peter Groenewegen 
 
Global Pipelines or global buzz? A micro-level approach towards the 
knowledge-based view of clusters, 33 p. 
 
2009-3 
 
Julie E. Ferguson 
Marleen H. Huysman 
 
Between ambition and approach: Towards sustainable knowledge management 
in development organizations, 33 p. 
   
2009-4 Mark G. Leijsen Why empirical cost functions get scale economies wrong, 11 p. 
   
2009-5 Peter Nijkamp 
Galit Cohen-
Blankshtain 
The importance of ICT for cities: e-governance and cyber perceptions, 14 p. 
   
2009-6 Eric de Noronha Vaz 
Mário Caetano 
Peter Nijkamp 
Trapped between antiquity and urbanism. A multi-criteria assessment model of 
the greater Cairo metropolitan area, 22 p. 
   
2009-7 Eric de Noronha Vaz 
Teresa de Noronha 
Vaz 
Peter Nijkamp 
Spatial analysis for policy evaluation of the rural world: Portuguese agriculture 
in the last decade, 16 p. 
   
2009-8 Teresa de Noronha 
Vaz 
Peter Nijkamp 
Multitasking in the rural world: Technological change and sustainability, 20 p.  
   
2009-9 Maria Teresa 
Borzacchiello 
Vincenzo Torrieri 
Peter Nijkamp 
An operational information systems architecture for assessing sustainable 
transportation planning: Principles and design, 17 p. 
   
2009-10 Vincenzo Del Giudice 
Pierfrancesco De Paola 
Francesca Torrieri 
Francesca Pagliari 
Peter Nijkamp 
A decision support system for real estate investment choice, 16 p. 
   
2009-11 Miruna Mazurencu 
Marinescu 
Peter Nijkamp 
IT companies in rough seas: Predictive factors for bankruptcy risk in Romania, 
13 p. 
   
2009-12 Boriana Rukanova 
Helle Zinner 
Hendriksen 
Eveline van Stijn 
Yao-Hua Tan 
Bringing is innovation in a highly-regulated environment: A collective action 
perspective, 33 p. 
   
2009-13 Patricia van Hemert 
Peter Nijkamp 
Jolanda Verbraak 
Evaluating social science and humanities knowledge production: an exploratory 
analysis of dynamics in science systems, 20 p. 
   
2009-14 Roberto Patuelli 
Aura Reggiani 
Peter Nijkamp 
Norbert Schanne 
Neural networks for cross-sectional employment forecasts: A comparison of 
model specifications for Germany, 15 p. 
   
2009-15 André de Waal 
Karima Kourtit 
Peter Nijkamp 
The relationship between the level of completeness of a strategic performance 
management system and perceived advantages and disadvantages, 19 p. 
   
2009-16 Vincenzo Punzo 
Vincenzo Torrieri 
Maria Teresa 
Borzacchiello 
Biagio Ciuffo 
Peter Nijkamp 
Modelling intermodal re-balance and integration: planning a sub-lagoon tube for 
Venezia, 24 p. 
   
2009-17 Peter Nijkamp 
Roger Stough 
Mediha Sahin 
Impact of social and  human capital on business performance of migrant 
entrepreneurs – a comparative Dutch-US study, 31 p. 
   
2009-18 Dres Creal A survey of sequential Monte Carlo methods for economics and finance, 54 p. 
 
 
 
   
2009-19 Karima Kourtit 
André de Waal 
Strategic performance management in practice: Advantages, disadvantages and 
reasons for use, 15 p. 
   
2009-20 Karima Kourtit 
André de Waal 
Peter Nijkamp 
Strategic performance management and creative industry, 17 p. 
   
2009-21 Eric de Noronha Vaz 
Peter Nijkamp 
Historico-cultural sustainability and urban dynamics – a geo-information 
science approach to the Algarve area, 25 p. 
   
2009-22 Roberta Capello 
Peter Nijkamp 
Regional growth and development theories revisited, 19 p. 
   
2009-23 M. Francesca Cracolici 
Miranda Cuffaro 
Peter Nijkamp 
Tourism sustainability and economic efficiency – a statistical analysis of Italian 
provinces, 14 p. 
   
2009-24 Caroline A. Rodenburg 
Peter Nijkamp 
Henri L.F. de Groot 
Erik T. Verhoef 
Valuation of multifunctional land use by commercial investors: A case study on 
the Amsterdam Zuidas mega-project, 21 p. 
   
2009-25 Katrin Oltmer 
Peter Nijkamp 
Raymond Florax 
Floor Brouwer 
Sustainability and agri-environmental policy in the European Union: A meta-
analytic investigation, 26 p. 
   
2009-26 Francesca Torrieri 
Peter Nijkamp 
Scenario analysis in spatial impact assessment: A methodological approach, 20 
p. 
   
2009-27 Aliye Ahu Gülümser 
Tüzin Baycan-Levent 
Peter Nijkamp 
Beauty is in the eyes of the beholder: A logistic regression analysis of 
sustainability and locality as competitive vehicles for human settlements, 14 p. 
2009-28 Marco Percoco 
Peter Nijkamp 
Individual time preferences and social discounting in environmental projects, 24 
p. 
   
2009-29 Peter Nijkamp 
Maria Abreu 
Regional development theory, 12 p. 
   
2009-30 Tüzin Baycan-Levent 
Peter Nijkamp 
7 FAQs in urban planning, 22 p.  
   
2009-31 Aliye Ahu Gülümser 
Tüzin Baycan-Levent 
Peter Nijkamp 
Turkey’s rurality: A comparative analysis at the EU level, 22 p. 
   
2009-32 Frank Bruinsma 
Karima Kourtit 
Peter Nijkamp 
An agent-based decision support model for the development of e-services in the 
tourist sector, 21 p. 
   
2009-33 Mediha Sahin 
Peter Nijkamp 
Marius Rietdijk 
Cultural diversity and urban innovativeness: Personal and business 
characteristics of urban migrant entrepreneurs, 27 p. 
   
2009-34 Peter Nijkamp 
Mediha Sahin 
Performance indicators of urban migrant entrepreneurship in the Netherlands, 28 
p. 
   
2009-35 Manfred M. Fischer 
Peter Nijkamp 
Entrepreneurship and regional development, 23 p. 
   
2009-36 Faroek Lazrak 
Peter Nijkamp 
Piet Rietveld 
Jan Rouwendal 
Cultural heritage and creative cities: An economic evaluation perspective, 20 p. 
   
2009-37 Enno Masurel 
Peter Nijkamp 
Bridging the gap between institutions of higher education and small and 
medium-size enterprises, 32 p. 
   
2009-38 Francesca Medda 
Peter Nijkamp 
Piet Rietveld 
Dynamic effects of external and private transport costs on urban shape: A 
morphogenetic perspective, 17 p. 
   
2009-39 Roberta Capello 
Peter Nijkamp 
Urban economics at a cross-yard: Recent theoretical and methodological 
directions and future challenges, 16 p. 
   
2009-40 Enno Masurel 
Peter Nijkamp 
The low participation of urban migrant entrepreneurs: Reasons and perceptions 
of weak institutional embeddedness, 23 p. 
   
2009-41 Patricia van Hemert 
Peter Nijkamp 
Knowledge investments, business R&D and innovativeness of countries. A 
qualitative meta-analytic comparison, 25 p. 
   
2009-42 Teresa de Noronha 
Vaz 
Peter Nijkamp 
Knowledge and innovation: The strings between global and local dimensions of 
sustainable growth, 16 p. 
   
2009-43 Chiara M. Travisi 
Peter Nijkamp 
Managing environmental risk in agriculture: A systematic perspective on the 
potential of quantitative policy-oriented risk valuation, 19 p. 
   
2009-44 Sander de Leeuw Logistics aspects of emergency preparedness in flood disaster prevention, 24 p. 
Iris F.A. Vis 
Sebastiaan B. Jonkman 
   
2009-45 Eveline S. van 
Leeuwen 
Peter Nijkamp 
Social accounting matrices. The development and application of SAMs at the 
local level, 26 p. 
   
2009-46 Tibert Verhagen 
Willemijn van Dolen 
The influence of online store characteristics on consumer impulsive decision-
making: A model and empirical application, 33 p. 
   
2009-47 Eveline van Leeuwen 
Peter Nijkamp 
A micro-simulation model for e-services in cultural heritage tourism, 23 p. 
   
2009-48 Andrea Caragliu 
Chiara Del Bo 
Peter Nijkamp 
Smart cities in Europe, 15 p. 
   
2009-49 Faroek Lazrak 
Peter Nijkamp 
Piet Rietveld 
Jan Rouwendal 
Cultural heritage: Hedonic prices for non-market values, 11 p. 
   
2009-50 Eric de Noronha Vaz 
João Pedro Bernardes 
Peter Nijkamp 
Past landscapes for the reconstruction of Roman land use: Eco-history tourism 
in the Algarve, 23 p. 
   
2009-51 Eveline van Leeuwen 
Peter Nijkamp 
Teresa de Noronha 
Vaz 
The Multi-functional use of urban green space, 12 p. 
   
2009-52 Peter Bakker 
Carl Koopmans 
Peter Nijkamp 
Appraisal of integrated transport policies, 20 p. 
   
2009-53 Luca De Angelis 
Leonard J. Paas 
The dynamics analysis and prediction of stock markets through the latent 
Markov model, 29 p. 
   
2009-54 Jan Anne Annema 
Carl Koopmans 
Een lastige praktijk: Ervaringen met waarderen van omgevingskwaliteit in de 
kosten-batenanalyse, 17 p. 
   
2009-55 Bas Straathof 
Gert-Jan Linders 
Europe’s internal market at fifty: Over the hill? 39 p. 
   
2009-56 Joaquim A.S. 
Gromicho 
Jelke J. van Hoorn 
Francisco Saldanha-
da-Gama 
Gerrit T. Timmer 
Exponentially better than brute force: solving the job-shop scheduling problem 
optimally by dynamic programming, 14 p. 
   
2009-57 Carmen Lee 
Roman Kraeussl 
Leo Paas 
The effect of anticipated and experienced regret and pride on investors’ future 
selling decisions, 31 p. 
   
2009-58 René Sitters Efficient algorithms for average completion time scheduling, 17 p. 
2009-59 Masood Gheasi 
Peter Nijkamp 
Piet Rietveld 
Migration and tourist flows, 20 p. 
   
   
   
   
 
2010-1 Roberto Patuelli 
Norbert Schanne 
Daniel A. Griffith 
Peter Nijkamp 
Persistent disparities in regional unemployment: Application of a spatial 
filtering approach to local labour markets in Germany, 28 p. 
   
2010-2 Thomas de Graaff 
Ghebre Debrezion 
Piet Rietveld 
Schaalsprong Almere. Het effect van bereikbaarheidsverbeteringen op de 
huizenprijzen in Almere, 22 p. 
   
2010-3 John Steenbruggen 
Maria Teresa 
Borzacchiello 
Peter Nijkamp 
Henk Scholten 
Real-time data from mobile phone networks for urban incidence and traffic 
management – a review of application and opportunities, 23 p. 
   
2010-4 Marc D. Bahlmann 
Tom Elfring 
Peter Groenewegen 
Marleen H. Huysman 
Does distance matter? An ego-network approach towards the knowledge-based 
theory of clusters, 31 p. 
   
2010-5 Jelke J. van Hoorn A note on the worst case complexity for the capacitated vehicle routing problem, 
3 p. 
   
2010-6 Mark G. Lijesen Empirical applications of spatial competition; an interpretative literature review, 
16 p. 
   
2010-7 Carmen Lee 
Roman Kraeussl 
Leo Paas 
Personality and investment: Personality differences affect investors’ adaptation 
to losses, 28 p. 
   
2010-8 Nahom Ghebrihiwet 
Evgenia Motchenkova 
Leniency programs in the presence of judicial errors, 21 p. 
   
2010-9 Meindert J. Flikkema 
Ard-Pieter de Man 
Matthijs Wolters 
New trademark registration as an indicator of innovation: results of an 
explorative study of Benelux trademark data, 53 p. 
   
2010-10 Jani Merikivi 
Tibert Verhagen 
Frans Feldberg 
Having belief(s) in social virtual worlds: A decomposed approach, 37 p. 
   
2010-11 Umut Kilinç Price-cost markups and productivity dynamics of entrant plants, 34 p. 
   
2010-12 Umut Kilinç Measuring competition in a frictional economy, 39 p. 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
   
   
   
 
2011-1 Yoshifumi Takahashi 
Peter Nijkamp 
Multifunctional agricultural land use in sustainable world, 25 p. 
   
2011-2 Paulo A.L.D. Nunes 
Peter Nijkamp 
Biodiversity: Economic perspectives, 37 p. 
   
2011-3 Eric de Noronha Vaz 
Doan Nainggolan 
Peter Nijkamp 
Marco Painho 
A complex spatial systems analysis of tourism and urban sprawl in the Algarve, 
23 p. 
   
2011-4 Karima Kourtit 
Peter Nijkamp 
Strangers on the move. Ethnic entrepreneurs as urban change actors, 34 p. 
   
2011-5 Manie Geyer 
Helen C. Coetzee 
Danie Du Plessis 
Ronnie Donaldson 
Peter Nijkamp 
Recent business transformation in intermediate-sized cities in South Africa, 30 
p. 
   
2011-6 Aki Kangasharju 
Christophe Tavéra 
Peter Nijkamp 
Regional growth and unemployment. The validity of Okun’s law for the Finnish 
regions, 17 p. 
   
2011-7 Amitrajeet A. Batabyal 
Peter Nijkamp 
A Schumpeterian model of entrepreneurship, innovation, and regional economic 
growth, 30 p. 
   
2011-8 Aliye Ahu Akgün 
Tüzin Baycan Levent 
Peter Nijkamp 
The engine of sustainable rural development: Embeddedness of entrepreneurs in 
rural Turkey, 17 p. 
   
2011-9 Aliye Ahu Akgün 
Eveline van Leeuwen 
Peter Nijkamp 
A systemic perspective on multi-stakeholder sustainable development strategies, 
26 p. 
   
2011-10 Tibert Verhagen 
Jaap van Nes 
Frans Feldberg 
Willemijn van Dolen 
Virtual customer service agents: Using social presence and personalization to 
shape online service encounters, 48 p. 
   
2011-11 Henk J. Scholten 
Maarten van der Vlist 
De inrichting van crisisbeheersing, de relatie tussen besluitvorming en 
informatievoorziening. Casus: Warroom project Netcentrisch werken bij 
Rijkswaterstaat, 23 p. 
   
2011-12 Tüzin Baycan 
Peter Nijkamp 
A socio-economic impact analysis of cultural diversity, 22 p. 
   
2011-13 Aliye Ahu Akgün 
Tüzin Baycan 
Peter Nijkamp 
Repositioning rural areas as promising future hot spots, 22 p. 
   
2011-14 Selmar Meents 
Tibert Verhagen 
Paul Vlaar 
How sellers can stimulate purchasing in electronic marketplaces: Using 
information as a risk reduction signal, 29 p. 
   
   
2011-15 Aliye Ahu Gülümser 
Tüzin Baycan-Levent 
Peter Nijkamp 
Measuring regional creative capacity: A literature review for rural-specific 
approaches, 22 p. 
   
2011-16 Frank Bruinsma 
Karima Kourtit 
Peter Nijkamp 
Tourism, culture and e-services: Evaluation of e-services packages, 30 p. 
   
2011-17 Peter Nijkamp 
Frank Bruinsma 
Karima Kourtit 
Eveline van Leeuwen 
Supply of and demand for e-services in the cultural sector: Combining top-down 
and bottom-up perspectives, 16 p. 
   
2011-18 Eveline van Leeuwen 
Peter Nijkamp 
Piet Rietveld 
Climate change: From global concern to regional challenge, 17 p. 
   
2011-19 Eveline van Leeuwen 
Peter Nijkamp 
Operational advances in tourism research, 25 p. 
   
2011-20 Aliye Ahu Akgün 
Tüzin Baycan 
Peter Nijkamp 
Creative capacity for sustainable development: A comparative analysis of 
European and Turkish rural regions, 18 p. 
   
2011-21 Aliye Ahu Gülümser 
Tüzin Baycan-Levent 
Peter Nijkamp 
Business dynamics as the source of counterurbanisation: An empirical analysis 
of Turkey, 18 p. 
   
2011-22 Jessie Bakens 
Peter Nijkamp 
Lessons from migration impact analysis, 19 p. 
   
2011-23 Peter Nijkamp 
Galit Cohen-
blankshtain 
Opportunities and pitfalls of local e-democracy, 17 p. 
   
2011-24 Maura Soekijad 
Irene Skovgaard Smith 
The ‘lean people’ in hospital change: Identity work as social differentiation, 30 
p. 
   
2011-25 Evgenia Motchenkova 
Olgerd Rus 
Research joint ventures and price collusion: Joint analysis of the impact of R&D 
subsidies and antitrust fines, 30 p. 
   
2011-26 Karima Kourtit 
Peter Nijkamp 
Strategic choice analysis by expert panels for migration impact assessment, 41 
p. 
   
2011-27  Faroek Lazrak 
Peter Nijkamp 
Piet Rietveld 
Jan Rouwendal 
The market value of listed heritage: An urban economic application of spatial 
hedonic pricing, 24 p. 
   
2011-28 Peter Nijkamp Socio-economic impacts of heterogeneity among foreign migrants: Research 
and policy challenges, 17 p. 
   
2011-29 Masood Gheasi  
Peter Nijkamp 
Migration, tourism and international trade: Evidence from the UK, 8 p. 
   
2011-30 Karima Kourtit Evaluation of cyber-tools in cultural tourism, 24 p. 
Peter Nijkamp 
Eveline van Leeuwen 
Frank Bruinsma 
   
2011-31 Cathy Macharis 
Peter Nijkamp 
Possible bias in multi-actor multi-criteria transportation evaluation: Issues and 
solutions, 16 p. 
   
2011-32 John Steenbruggen 
Maria Teresa 
Borzacchiello 
Peter Nijkamp 
Henk Scholten 
The use of GSM data for transport safety management: An exploratory review, 
29 p. 
   
2011-33 John Steenbruggen 
Peter Nijkamp 
Jan M. Smits 
Michel Grothe 
Traffic incident management: A common operational picture to support 
situational awareness of sustainable mobility, 36 p. 
   
2011-34 Tüzin Baycan 
Peter Nijkamp 
Students’ interest in an entrepreneurial career in a multicultural society, 25 p. 
   
2011-35 Adele Finco 
Deborah Bentivoglio 
Peter Nijkamp 
Integrated evaluation of biofuel production options in agriculture: An 
exploration of sustainable policy scenarios, 16 p. 
   
2011-36 Eric de Noronha Vaz 
Pedro Cabral 
Mário Caetano 
Peter Nijkamp 
Marco Paínho 
Urban heritage endangerment at the interface of future cities and past heritage: 
A spatial vulnerability assessment, 25 p. 
   
2011-37 Maria Giaoutzi 
Anastasia Stratigea 
Eveline van Leeuwen 
Peter Nijkamp 
Scenario analysis in foresight: AG2020, 23 p. 
   
2011-38 Peter Nijkamp 
Patricia van Hemert 
Knowledge infrastructure and regional growth, 12 p. 
   
2011-39 Patricia van Hemert 
Enno Masurel 
Peter Nijkamp 
 
The role of knowledge sources of SME’s for innovation perception and regional 
innovation policy, 27 p. 
2011-40 Eric de Noronha Vaz 
Marco Painho 
Peter Nijkamp 
Impacts of environmental law and regulations on agricultural land-use change 
and urban pressure: The Algarve case, 18 p. 
   
2011-41 Karima Kourtit 
Peter Nijkamp 
Steef Lowik 
Frans van Vught 
Paul Vulto 
From islands of innovation to creative hotspots, 26 p. 
   
2011-42 Alina Todiras 
Peter Nijkamp 
Saidas Rafijevas 
Innovative marketing strategies for national industrial flagships: Brand 
repositioning for accessing upscale markets, 27 p. 
2011-43 Eric de Noronha Vaz 
Mário Caetano 
Peter Nijkamp 
A multi-level spatial urban pressure analysis of the Giza Pyramid Plateau in 
Egypt, 18 p. 
   
2011-44 Andrea Caragliu 
Chiara Del Bo 
Peter Nijkamp 
A map of human capital in European cities, 36 p. 
   
2011-45 Patrizia Lombardi 
Silvia Giordano 
Andrea Caragliu 
Chiara Del Bo 
Mark Deakin 
Peter Nijkamp 
Karima Kourtit 
An advanced triple-helix network model for smart cities performance, 22 p. 
   
2011-46 Jessie Bakens 
Peter Nijkamp 
Migrant heterogeneity and urban development: A conceptual analysis, 17 p. 
   
2011-47 Irene Casas 
Maria Teresa 
Borzacchiello 
Biagio Ciuffo 
Peter Nijkamp 
Short and long term effects of sustainable mobility policy: An exploratory case 
study, 20 p. 
   
2011-48 Christian Bogmans Can globalization outweigh free-riding? 27 p. 
   
2011-49 Karim Abbas 
Bernd Heidergott 
Djamil Aïssani 
A Taylor series expansion approach to the functional approximation of finite 
queues, 26 p. 
   
2011-50 Eric Koomen Indicators of rural vitality. A GIS-based analysis of socio-economic 
development of the rural Netherlands, 17 p. 
 
2012-1 Aliye Ahu Gülümser 
Tüzin Baycan Levent 
Peter Nijkamp 
Jacques Poot 
The role of local and newcomer entrepreneurs in rural development: A 
comparative meta-analytic study, 39 p. 
   
2012-2 Joao Romao 
Bart Neuts 
Peter Nijkamp 
Eveline van Leeuwen 
Urban tourist complexes as Multi-product companies: Market segmentation and 
product differentiation in Amsterdam, 18 p. 
   
2012-3 Vincent A.C. van den 
Berg 
Step tolling with price sensitive demand: Why more steps in the toll makes the 
consumer better off, 20 p. 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
